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REASONABLE ACTION: REPRODUCTIVE 
RIGHTS, THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE, 
AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN THE 
UNITED STATES AND THE REPUBLIC OF 
IRELAND 
LIAM RAY†
INTRODUCTION 
 
Each year, the United States Supreme Court denies 
thousands of petitions for certiorari.1  For the vast majority of 
these petitions, the final words spoken on the case are terse.  The 
denied petitions are listed underneath a bolded, fully-capitalized 
CERTIORARI DENIED heading and that is the last anyone 
hears of them.2
The Stormans dissent began dramatically: “This case is an 
ominous sign,” wrote Justice Samuel Alito, joined by Chief 
Justice John Roberts and Justice Clarence Thomas.
  Occasionally, however, one or more of the 
members of the Court feel strongly enough that a case should 
have been heard that they compose a dissent.  Stormans v. 
Wiesman was one such case. 
3  Justice 
Alito went on to argue that denying certiorari imperiled the 
viability of future cases asserting rights to the free exercise of 
religion under the Constitution’s Free Exercise Clause.4
 
† Senior Articles Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D., 2018, St. John’s University School of 
Law. I would like to thank my Note advisor, Professor Mark Movsesian, for all of the 
help he gave me in choosing my thesis, writing my Note, and editing it to be fit for 
publication. I could not have completed this project without him, and I will always 
be grateful for his mentorship. I would also like to thank the staff and editors of the 
Law Review for all of their hard work preparing this piece for publication. 
 
1 The Justices’ Caseload, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,  
https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/justicecaseload.aspx (last visited Feb. 27, 2018) 
(stating that of the 7,000-8,000 cases filed with the Court each year, only around 80 
are granted plenary review and about 100 or more are disposed of without plenary 
review). 
2 Miscellaneous Order, 579 U.S. ___ (June 28, 2016), https://www.supremecourt. 
gov/orders/courtorders/062816zr_29m1.pdf  
3 Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman, 136 S. Ct. 2433, 2433 (2016) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
4 U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 1. 
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Stormans involved an ongoing problem not unique to 
Washington State, where the case arose, or even to the United 
States generally.  The Stormans family, through their closely 
held corporation, Stormans, Inc., owned a grocery store in 
Olympia, Washington.5  Within this grocery store was a general 
pharmacy.6  The Stormans family are devout Christians and ran 
their company in accordance with their beliefs.7  They faced no 
issues in doing so until 2005, when the State of Washington 
passed new regulations that required pharmacies to stock and 
dispense the so-called “morning-after” and “week-after” pills.8  
The Stormans believe that these emergency contraceptives have 
the potential to cause an abortion, and since participating in an 
abortion would violate their religious beliefs, the Stormans 
declined to carry such drugs in their pharmacy.9
For its part, in passing these new regulations, the State of 
Washington was reacting to a nationwide movement in favor of 
broadening access to these drugs as part of a commitment to 
ensure citizens’ full protection of their reproductive rights.
 
10  
Critics have complained that it is unethical for pharmacists, 
medical professionals, to employ their individual moral beliefs on 
the job by refusing to provide emergency contraceptives.11  The 
stage was set for a conflict involving sensitive issues and 
fundamental Constitutional rights.  After the State of 
Washington issued the Stormans several citations for violating 
the new stocking and dispensing rules, the Stormans sued in 
federal court for an injunction preventing the State from 
enforcing the rules against them.12
 
 
 
 
5 Stormans, 136 S. Ct. at 2433. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 Stormans v. Wiesman, BECKET, http://www.becketlaw.org/case/stormans-v-
wiesman/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2018). 
9 Id. 
10 Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 854 F. Supp. 2d 925, 935 (W.D. Wash. 2012), rev’d 
sub nom. Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman, 794 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 2015). 
11 Pharmacists Should Not Be Allowed To Opt Out Of Selling Morning After Pill 
On Ethical Grounds, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 31, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost. 
co.uk/2013/01/31/health-pharmacists-refuse-morning-after-pill-ethical-banned_n_25 
88021.html. 
12 Stormans v. Wiesman, BECKET, supra note 8. 
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The trial court found in favor of the Stormans on their Free 
Exercise Clause claim, but the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit reversed.13
This Note will argue that by denying certiorari in Stormans 
v. Wiesman, the Supreme Court missed an important opportunity 
to provide guidance to the states as to how the Free Exercise 
Clause applies to the kind of stocking and dispensing regulations 
adopted by the State of Washington.  This Note will further 
argue from a policy perspective that the approach to these kinds 
of regulations adopted by the Republic of Ireland (“ROI”) 
presents the best approach for states to adopt because it provides 
a balance in terms of respecting the free exercise rights of 
pharmacists and pharmacy owners with the reproductive rights 
of the general public.  In Part I, this Note will survey the history 
of the Supreme Court’s Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence, with 
particular emphasis placed on Employment Division v. Smith 
and the dramatic changes it made to existing jurisprudence at 
the time it was decided.  In Part II, this Note will consider the 
Stormans case in detail from the decision of the trial court, 
through the Ninth Circuit’s reversal, and the ultimate denial of 
certiorari over the dissent of three justices.  In Part III, this Note 
will examine the approach to this problem taken by ROI, 
highlighting its relatively uncontroversial history and flexible 
standards.  Finally, in Part IV, this Note will first argue that the 
Supreme Court should have taken and reversed the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision as inconsistent with precedent and overly 
skeptical of the factual conclusions of the trial court. Then, it will 
propose that the ROI approach to these regulations is the best 
from a policy perspective because it provides the best balance of 
religious and reproductive rights. 
  By denying certiorari in the case, 
the Supreme Court missed an important opportunity to clarify 
the scope of the Free Exercise Clause, and to provide guidance to 
the states on how best to ensure that both free exercise rights 
and reproductive rights are respected. 
I. THE HISTORY OF FREE EXERCISE JURISPRUDENCE 
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the Free Exercise 
Clause has alternated between strict and loose interpretations of 
its breadth.  One of the questions the Court has confronted most 
 
13 Id. 
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often is to what degree private individuals should be able to 
disregard generally applicable laws that conflict with their 
religious beliefs. 
A. The Reynolds Approach to Free Exercise Claims 
The Court addressed this question for the first time in 1878 
in Reynolds v. United States.14  Reynolds involved a challenge to 
the federal government’s prohibition of bigamy in the territories, 
known as the Morrill Act for the Suppression of Bigamy.15  
Mormon church member George Reynolds, a bigamist and 
member of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, was 
convicted under the Act.16  He appealed his case all the way to 
the Supreme Court, where he argued that bigamy was a required 
practice of his religion and therefore the Free Exercise Clause 
should protect him from legal punishment for engaging in it.17
In rejecting his Free Exercise claim, the Court spoke in 
absolute terms: “Laws are made for the government of actions, 
and while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and 
opinions, they may with practices.”
 
18  The Court seemed 
dismissive even of the idea that one could avoid complying with 
generally applicable laws because of one’s religious duty; the 
Chief Justice, writing for the majority, famously declared that to 
allow citizens to avoid conviction under such laws because of the 
right to free exercise would “permit every citizen to become a law 
unto himself.”19
B. A New Approach: Sherbert v. Verner 
  While the Court did not define the meaning of 
the Free Exercise Clause per se, it did say what the Clause was 
not: a license to disregard laws that apply to everyone equally. 
After Reynolds, the Supreme Court did not address the Free 
Exercise Clause again until it incorporated the Clause against 
the states in the 1940 case Cantwell v. Connecticut.20
 
14 See 98 U.S. 145, 161–62 (1878); DONALD L. DRAKEMAN, CHURCH, STATE, AND 
ORIGINAL INTENT 21 (2010).  
  This set 
the stage for the Court to revisit the meaning of the Clause in 
15 DRAKEMAN, supra note 14, at 26. 
16 Id. at 28. 
17 Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 161–62. 
18 Id. at 166. 
19 Id. at 167. 
20 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
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1963 in Sherbert v. Verner.  The plaintiff, Adell H. Sherbert, was 
a Seventh Day Adventist who lost her job at a textile mill after 
refusing to work on Saturdays, which the Seventh Day Adventist 
religion recognizes as the Sabbath.21  The South Carolina 
Employment Security Commission found that she had been fired 
because she chose not to come to work voluntarily, and it 
disqualified her from receiving unemployment benefits for five 
weeks.22  The Court first found that the disqualification imposed 
a burden on Sherbert’s free exercise of her religion;23 Justice 
William Brennan, writing for the majority, decried the 
“unmistakable” pressure exerted by the state on Sherbert to 
compel her to forego her religious practice: “The ruling forces her 
to choose between following the precepts of her religion and 
forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the 
precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other 
hand.”24
After finding that Sherbert’s free exercise rights had been 
violated, it remained for the Court to determine whether or not 
the State’s violation of her rights was constitutionally valid.
 
25  
The Court applied a variety of strict scrutiny26 which would come 
to be known as the “Sherbert test”27 and determined that the 
State had failed to present the compelling government interest 
necessary for its action to be upheld.28
The Sherbert Court’s approach represented a radical 
departure from that taken by the Reynolds Court.  While the 
Reynolds Court focused its inquiry on the nature of the law being 
challenged, the Sherbert Court focused on the burden to the 
 
 
21 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 398–99, 399 n.1 (1963). 
22 Id. at 399–401, 400 n.3. 
23 Id. at 404. 
24 Id. 
25 In other words, the plaintiff must first show that his or her sincerely held 
religious beliefs are burdened by the government in some way in order to invoke 
Sherbert-style strict scrutiny. Kenneth Marin, Employment Division v. Smith: The 
Supreme Court Alters the State of Free Exercise Doctrine, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 1431, 
1438 (1990). 
26 Strict scrutiny in the context of the Free Exercise Clause requires that the 
government actor base its action on a compelling government interest; once it has 
proven a compelling government interest, it must then show that the method it 
chose to advance the interest is the least restrictive means of advancing that 
interest. Id. at 1438–39. 
27 Lee Boothby, Government Entanglement with Religion: What Degree of Proof 
Is Required?, 7 PEPP. L. REV. 613, 615 (1980). 
28 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406–09. 
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individual challenging the violation of her rights.  The tug-of-war 
between these two approaches did not end after the 
establishment of the Sherbert test. 
The Court next applied the Sherbert test in a 1973 case, 
Wisconsin v. Yoder.  The appellant in Yoder, an Amish man, 
challenged his conviction under a Wisconsin law requiring 
students to attend school through the high school level.29  He had 
withdrawn his children from public school upon their completion 
of the eighth grade.30  He argued that the Free Exercise Clause 
protected his right to withdraw his children from public school 
after the eighth grade because the Amish religion required him 
to more closely supervise their religious education at that point 
in their lives.31  The Court accepted his argument, ruling that the 
Wisconsin law could not constitutionally be applied to him.32  In 
so holding, the Court reaffirmed the principle it had enunciated 
in Sherbert: even “[a] regulation neutral on its face may, in its 
application, nonetheless offend the constitutional requirement for 
governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens the free exercise of 
religion.”33
C. Employment Division v. Smith: The Reynolds Approach 
Revived 
 
The stated tension between supporters of the Reynolds 
approach to the Free Exercise Clause and supporters of the 
Sherbert test had not yet ended, however.  Throughout the 1980s, 
the Supreme Court became increasingly skeptical of Free 
Exercise claims, often finding that asserted government interests 
were compelling while construing the interests of the religious 
objectors narrowly34
Employment Division v. Smith involved a set of facts similar 
to those which had resulted in the creation of the Sherbert test.  
Once again, plaintiffs challenged a state’s denial of 
  This trend culminated in the 1991 
Employment Division v. Smith decision, a watershed case that 
marked the Court’s return to the Reynolds approach. 
 
29 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207–08 (1972). 
30 Id. at 207. 
31 Id. at 217–18. 
32 Id. at 234. 
33 Id. at 220 (citations omitted). 
34 Marin, supra note 25, at 1445. 
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unemployment benefits.35  Alfred Smith and Galen Black, 
members of the Native American Church, worked for a private 
drug rehabilitation center in Oregon.36  As employees, Smith and 
Black consumed peyote as part of a Native American Church 
ritual, despite the possession of the drug being illegal in 
Oregon.37  Consequently, both men were fired from their jobs at 
the private rehab facility, and applied to the Employment 
Division for unemployment benefits.38  The Employment Division 
determined that they were ineligible for unemployment benefits 
because they had been fired from their jobs due to work-related 
misconduct.39
The United States Supreme Court ruled on the case after the 
Oregon Supreme Court determined that the Oregon statute, 
which prohibited the use of peyote, as applied to the defendants, 
was unconstitutional under the Free Exercise Clause.
 
40  The 
majority opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia marked a return to 
the Reynolds approach to the Free Exercise Clause.  Justice 
Scalia first noted that there was no question that if a state 
wanted to regulate conduct purely because it was engaged in for 
a religious reason, it could not do so.41  He distinguished that 
circumstance, however, from that of a generally applicable state 
prohibition of conduct which only incidentally burdened the 
practice of religion.42  In this second situation, Justice Scalia 
reasoned, the Supreme Court had never before struck down a 
state law as unconstitutional purely on the basis that it violated 
the Free Exercise Clause.43  In other words, states can refuse to 
provide accommodations to neutral laws of general applicability 
without violating the Free Exercise Clause, subject to certain 
exceptions.44
 
35 Emp’t Div., Dept. of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874 (1990). 
  
 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 876. See also Smith v. Emp’t Div., 763 P.2d 146, 150 (Or. 1988), rev’d 
sub nom. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
41 Smith, 494 U.S. at 877–78. 
42 Id. at 878–79. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
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Justice Scalia went on to explain that neutral, generally 
applicable laws had only been struck down under the Free 
Exercise Clause in certain special circumstances.45  He first 
spoke of the so-called “hybrid rights exception.”46  The hybrid 
rights exception, Justice Scalia explained, had been the basis of 
the decision in Wisconsin v. Yoder to strike down the neutral, 
generally applicable school attendance law as applied to the 
Amish objectors.47  In that particular case, it had been the right 
to free exercise in combination with the right of parents to direct 
the education of their children which tilted the scales in favor of 
the Amish.48
Next, Justice Scalia discussed the “individual assessment 
exception.”  According to Justice Scalia, the individual 
assessment exception had been the rationale used by the court to 
find violations of the Free Exercise Clause in unemployment 
compensation cases like Sherbert.
 
49  The individual assessment 
exception means that if the government actor charged with 
enforcing a law is empowered to make exceptions to the law for 
individuals for secular reasons, it must grant exceptions for 
religious reasons as well.50  Thus, Justice Scalia reasoned, the 
Court in Sherbert had correctly held for the plaintiff because the 
unemployment compensation administrator had the ability to 
decide whether an employee had quit work or refused available 
work for “good cause” and had determined that the plaintiff’s 
refusal to work on Saturdays because of her religious convictions 
was not a “good cause.”51  He concluded that the Court’s 
“decisions in the unemployment cases stand for the proposition 
that where the State has in place a system of individual 
exemptions, it may not refuse to extend that system to cases of 
‘religious hardship’ without compelling reason.”52
 
 
 
45 Id. at 881–84. 
46 Ryan S. Rummage, In Combination: Using Hybrid Rights to Expand Religious 
Liberty, 64 EMORY L.J. 1175, 1184–85 (2015). 
47 Smith, 494 U.S. at 881. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 884. 
50 Brief of Religious Liberty Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 
2–3, Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman, 136 S. Ct. 2433 (2016) (No. 15-862). 
51 Smith, 494 U.S. at 884. 
52 Id. (quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 708 (1986)). 
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D. Post-Employment Division: Further Developments in Free 
Exercise Jurisprudence 
For practical purposes, the Sherbert test is dead.  The 
Reynolds approach with the exceptions laid out in Smith has 
become the law of the land.  Congress attempted to revive the use 
of strict scrutiny to evaluate even neutral, generally applicable 
laws by passing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act in 1993.53  
The Act received overwhelming bipartisan support, including a 
rare 97-3 vote in the Senate.54  Nevertheless, the Court struck it 
down as applied to the states in City of Boerne v. Flores, a 1997 
case involving a Catholic archbishop’s challenge to an 
unfavorable zoning decision.55
The Court has subjected a facially neutral, generally 
applicable law to strict scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause 
at least once since Smith.  In Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye 
v. City of Hialeah, the Court examined a Florida municipality’s 
ordinance banning animal sacrifice.
  The Smith approach remains the 
approach used to evaluate Free Exercise Clause claims involving 
neutral, generally applicable state laws. 
56  Notably, there was 
extensive evidence that, while the law in question was facially 
neutral, it had been enacted specifically in response to the 
practices of the active Santeria religious community in the city.57
While a seven-justice majority agreed that the law ought to 
be subject to strict scrutiny and that it failed that test, they 
   
 
53 Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 1993 
U.S.C.C.A.N. (107 Stat.) 1488, invalidated by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 
(1997). 
54 Roll Call Vote 103rd Congress – 1st Session, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate. 
gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=103&session=1&v
ote=00331 (last visited Feb. 28, 2018). 
55 See generally City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). At least thirty-two 
states have either passed their own laws similar to the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act (either as statutes or as amendments to state constitutions) or have 
state court decisions on the books which provide similar protections. Juliet Eilperin, 
31 States Have Heightened Religious Freedom Protections, WASH. POST (Mar. 1, 
2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2014/03/01/where-in-the-u-
s-are-there-heightened-protections-for-religious-freedom/?utm_term=.fed3d02e8fcf; 
State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (May 
4, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/state-rfra-statutes. 
aspx (stating that in 2015 Arkansas became the thirty-second state to enact a 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act-style provision). 
56 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 520 
(1993). 
57 Id. at 526–27. 
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disagreed widely as to why.58  Six justices joined the parts of 
Associate Justice Anthony Kennedy’s opinion which subjected the 
law to strict scrutiny and found that the city’s regulations 
violated the Free Exercise Clause.59  In a partial concurrence, 
Justice Scalia (joined by Chief Justice William Rehnquist) argued 
that Justice Kennedy should not have relied so heavily on 
legislative history to strike down the regulation, and further 
argued that had the town passed a facially neutral law with the 
intent to target the Santeria religion there would have been no 
violation.60  Justice Souter wrote his own concurrence which 
encouraged his colleagues to reexamine the Smith decision and 
its effect on existing Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence.61  
Justice Harry Blackmun, joined by Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor, openly challenged the Smith decision, arguing that it 
had been wrongly decided.62
II. STORMANS V. WIESMAN: A NEW CHALLENGE TO THE MEANING 
OF FREE EXERCISE 
 
Commentators have noted the inherent tension between 
ensuring access to emergency contraceptives while also 
respecting the religious objections of pharmacists to stocking and 
dispensing them.63  Critics on each side have accused the other of 
not giving due weight to their asserted interests.64
 
58 See generally id. 
  The State of 
Washington moved to address the controversy in the mid-2000s. 
59 Id. at 531–40, 542–47. 
60 See generally id. at 557–59 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment). 
61 See generally id. at 559–77 (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment). 
62 See generally id. at 577–80 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment). 
63 See Dennies Varughese, Comment, Conscience Misbranded!: Introducing the 
Performer v. Facilitator Model for Determining the Suitability of Including 
Pharmacists within Conscience Clause Legislation, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 649, 651 (2006); 
see also Claire A. Smearman, Drawing the Line: The Legal, Ethical and Public Policy 
Implications of Refusal Clauses for Pharmacists, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 469, 471–72 
(2006). 
64 Gene Veith, Christian Pharmacists Must Stock Abortifacients, CRANACH: THE 
BLOG OF VEITH (July 1, 2016), http://www.patheos.com/blogs/geneveith/2016/07/ 
christian-pharmacists-must-stock-abortifacients/; Pharmacists Should Not Be 
Allowed To Opt Out Of Selling Morning After Pill On Ethical Grounds, Argue 
Researchers; HUFFINGTON POST, supra note 11. 
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A. Lead-up to the Passage of the Regulations 
In 2005, in response to the passage of an Illinois law 
requiring pharmacies that stocked any kind of contraceptive to 
stock emergency contraceptives, pro-choice groups began to lobby 
Washington’s governor, Christine Gregoire (“the Governor”), to 
push for similar regulations in Washington.65  The State’s Board 
of Pharmacy (occasionally referred to hereafter as “the Board”) 
was responsible for regulating pharmacists in Washington.66  The 
Board was receptive to the idea of passing some kind of 
regulation regarding emergency contraceptives, but the majority 
of board members thought that any such regulation should 
include a conscience opt-out for objecting pharmacists, which 
would instead require them to refer those seeking emergency 
contraceptives to pharmacies which carried the drugs.67  This 
kind of referral process “has long been legal in all 50 states” and 
has been approved by the American Pharmacists Association.68
At a January 2006 meeting, a majority of board members 
indicated that they were in favor of adopting a regulation 
requiring pharmacies to stock emergency contraceptives, but the 
majority also agreed that the regulation should have a referral 
provision for pharmacists who objected to stocking the drugs on 
conscience grounds.
 
69  The Washington State Pharmacy 
Association (“WSPA”) endorsed this approach.70
Public hearings on the proposed regulation were held in 
April 2006.
 
71  Pro-choice attendees related “refusal stories” of 
incidents in which women seeking emergency contraceptives 
were denied them by objecting pharmacists.72
 
65 Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 854 F. Supp. 2d 925, 935–36 (W.D. Wash. 2012), 
rev’d sub nom. Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman, 794 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 2015). 
  After the hearings, 
the Board of Pharmacy drafted two versions of the proposed 
regulation: one which prevented pharmacists from referring 
patients seeking emergency contraceptives if the drugs were in 
stock and the patient could pay for them; and a second which 
allowed pharmacists to refuse to carry the drug for a variety of  
 
66 Id. at 932. 
67 Id. at 937. 
68 Stormans v. Wiesman, BECKET, supra note 8. 
69 Stormans, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 937. 
70 Id. at 935. 
71 Id. at 938. 
72 Id. at 938. 
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reasons, both secular and religious- or conscience-based, and to 
refer patients to pharmacies which did.73  At a June 1 meeting, 
the Board voted unanimously to adopt the latter regulation.74
Pro-choice groups presented the Governor with their own 
draft of the regulation one week after the June 1 vote.
 
75  Steven 
Saxe (“Mr. Saxe”), the executive director of the Board of 
Pharmacy, later testified that the primary difference between the 
rule passed on June 1 and the Governor’s new draft was that the 
Governor’s draft did not allow referrals for conscience reasons.76  
In fact, there was evidence that the draft was written that way 
on purpose—the Governor and her allies wanted to ensure that 
no conscience-based referrals would be allowed.77  The Governor 
then convened a taskforce composed of representatives from pro-
choice groups, the WSPA, and the Board in order to build support 
for her draft of the new rule.78
The taskforce ultimately reached a compromise: in exchange 
for the WSPA
 
79 dropping its proposal for a conscience-based 
referral exemption, the Governor’s allies on the taskforce agreed 
to permit referrals for a variety of other non-conscience and non-
religious reasons.80
 
73 Id. 
  Additionally, the Board’s counsel indicated to  
 
 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 939. 
76 Id. 
77 The trial court made findings of fact in regard to the following, among other 
evidence: a memo from the Governor to one of the supporters of the new rule asking 
“whether it was ‘clean enough for the advocates [i.e., Planned Parenthood, NWWLC 
and NARAL] re: conscious/moral issues’ ”; an email from Mr. Saxe which “explained 
the Governor's primary issue with the June 1 rule . . . ‘[T]he moral issue IS the basis 
of the concern’ ”; and another email from Mr. Saxe which he wrote to the 
Department of Health on the subject of how to ensure the rule reflected the 
Governor’s intent: “ ‘Would a statement that does not allow a pharmacist/pharmacy 
the right to refuse for moral or religious judgment be clearer? This would leave 
intact the ability to decline to dispense (provide alternatives) for most legitimate 
examples raised; clinical, fraud, business, skill, etc.’ ” Id. (emphasis in original). 
78 Id. at 940. No conscientious objectors or pro-life groups were invited to 
participate. Id. 
79 Rod Shafer of the WSPA had been the only member of the taskforce insisting 
on a conscience-based exemption. Id. at 941. 
80 Id. Interestingly, the taskforce also confronted the problem of conscientious 
objections to Washington’s Death with Dignity Act, which legalized physician-
assisted suicide. Members of the task force agreed to allow conscientious objection to 
the dispensing of lethal drugs. Id. 
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it that the Board would also have the power to make individual 
exemptions on a case-by-case basis.81  The Board approved the 
Governor’s final version of the regulations in April 2007.82
B. Proceedings in the Trial Court 
 
Stormans, Inc. is a closely held corporation owned by the 
Stormans family.83  At the time the pharmacy regulations 
relating to emergency contraceptives were passed, the 
corporation owned a grocery store with a general retail 
pharmacy.84  Members of the Stormans family believe that life 
begins at conception, and therefore refuse to sell abortifacient 
drugs on the ground that they can “potentially cause an 
abortion.”85
In July 2007, the family sued for an injunction to prevent the 
State of Washington from enforcing the new regulations against 
them.
   
86  The trial court, the United States District Court for the 
Western District of Washington, made extensive findings of fact 
with regard to the regulations after a twelve-day trial in 2012.87  
The court found that the rulemaking process had focused almost 
exclusively on the question of whether to allow conscience-based 
objections to the stocking of emergency contraceptives.88  The 
court also found that the process had been political, and that the 
Governor had repeatedly pressured the Board not to include 
conscience exemptions in the final regulations; she had even 
threatened to remove Board members who would not agree.89  
Witnesses from the Board confirmed at trial that they had not 
yet been able to identify a case of any kind of drug that could not 
be accessed, either before the new rules were promulgated, or 
after.90
 
81 Id. at 941–42. 
  The court rejected anecdotal stories of access problems 
provided by pro-choice groups, finding that the stories were  
 
82 Id. at 942. 
83 Id. at 931. 
84 Id. 
85 Stormans v. Wiesman, BECKET, supra note 8; Stormans, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 
932. 
86 Stormans v. Wiesman, BECKET, supra note 8. 
87 See generally Stormans, 854 F. Supp. 2d. 
88 Id. at 986. 
89 Id. at 987. 
90 Id. at 947. 
FINAL_RAY 9/10/2018  1:55 PM 
134 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:121   
either not relevant to the case or that they were the product of a 
test shopping campaign led by Planned Parenthood and other 
groups.91
The court did not focus exclusively on the rulemaking 
process; it also addressed the actual application of the rule.
 
92  
The trial court found that after the new regulations were passed, 
referrals continued to be allowed for a wide variety of non-
religious reasons.93  While some Board witnesses asserted that 
the intent of the regulations was to allow referrals for only a 
small number of non-religious reasons, the court found that the 
Board had interpreted the exemptions broadly to cover a wide 
variety of business reasons.94  Additionally, Board witnesses 
testified that in determining whether a given business reason fell 
within the exemptions allowed by the regulation, the Board 
would make determinations on a “case-by-case basis.”95
The trial court found that the regulations were not neutral 
and generally applicable: “In short, the Regulations were adopted 
‘because of’ conscientious objections to Plan B, not merely ‘in 
spite of’ them.”
 
96  The court then proceeded to apply strict 
scrutiny to the regulations and found them both over and 
underinclusive,97 meaning that they did not further the 
compelling state interest in ensuring access to medications.98
 
91 Id. at 950–51. The court found that Planned Parenthood and other groups 
posted advertisements on their websites soliciting women to call pharmacies to ask 
if they stocked emergency contraceptives and to go into pharmacies and see if 
pharmacists would actually dispense the drugs. Id. at 950. 
  
The court also held that the regulations as applied to the 
Stormans family would actually harm the State’s interest, as the 
Stormans family and other conscientious objectors would simply 
be forced to close their pharmacies or exit the pharmaceutical 
profession rather than dispense the drugs; this would make 
92 Id. at 987–88. 
93 The court found that referrals were permitted if a pharmacy was temporarily 
out of stock of a medication, if it did not take the patient’s insurance, if the 
pharmacist believed the patient was a drug abuser, if the pharmacist would have to 
alter the drug in some way before dispensing it, if the pharmacist would have to 
keep extra records on purchases of the drug, etc. See id. at 955–56. 
94 Id. at 957. 
95 Id. at 958. 
96 Id. at 987 (citing Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 
520, 540 (1993). 
97 Id. at 989–90. 
98 Id. 
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access to medications more difficult, not less.99  The court entered 
judgment in the form of a permanent injunction preventing 
Washington from applying its regulations to the Stormans 
family.100
C. The State of Washington’s Appeal to the Ninth Circuit 
 
The State of Washington appealed the decision to the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals.101  The Ninth Circuit found that the 
regulations’ delivery requirement “applie[d] to all objections to 
delivery that do not fall within an exemption, regardless of the 
motivation behind those objections.”102  Additionally, the Ninth 
Circuit panel disagreed with the trial court’s conclusion that the 
rule-makers had the impermissible motivation of targeting 
religious objectors specifically.103  Absent discriminatory intent or 
application, the Ninth Circuit held that the regulations were 
neutral for the purposes of analysis under Smith.104
The Ninth Circuit proceeded to consider whether the rules 
were generally applicable.  The court held that while the 
practices that were the subjects of the unwritten exemptions had 
in fact occurred, the Commission had not permitted them; rather, 
it had simply not received complaints about them.
 
105  Although 
the trial court had heard testimony from members of the 
Commission about how they believed the Commission would act 
if it did receive a complaint regarding the unwritten exemptions, 
the Ninth Circuit held that this was not the same as the 
Commission collectively giving an official interpretation of the 
rule.106
 
99 Id. at 990. 
 
100 Id. at 991–93. 
101 Stormans v. Wiesman, BECKET, supra note 8. 
102 Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman, 794 F.3d 1064, 1077 (9th Cir. 2015) (emphasis in 
original). The Ninth Circuit opinion seems to flatly contradict the factual findings of 
the trial court, which found precisely the opposite of what the Ninth Circuit did. The 
trial court found that the regulations do not operate neutrally because the 
Commission allows referrals for a wide variety of reasons not specifically mentioned 
in the regulation itself. Stormans, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 955–56. Additionally, the 
opinion included speculation about access problems if facilitated referrals were 
allowed. Stormans, 794 F.3d at 1078. This speculation was included despite the fact 
that Board witnesses could not identify a single case of an access problem caused by 
a facilitated referral regime in the trial court. Id. at 947. 
103 Stormans, 794 F.3d at 1078. 
104 Id. at 1079. 
105 Id. at 1080–81. 
106 Id. at 1081. 
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The Ninth Circuit also addressed the Stormans family’s 
contention that the regulations as written empowered the 
Commission to make individualized exemptions to the rules.107  
The court found that any discretion the Commission could 
exercise was tied to the objective, business-based criteria 
explicitly set out in the text of the regulation.108  The court again 
rejected the testimony of individual commission members on the 
subject and looked instead to the Commission’s official 
commentary, which rejected both religious-based exemptions and 
some business-based exemptions.109
Finally, the court considered the Stormans family’s dual 
claims: (1) that the rules had been enforced against them but not 
against Catholic hospitals, and (2) that religiously-motivated 
violations were punished but secularly-motivated violations were 
not.
 
110  The court held that the evidence merely showed that the 
enforcement process was complaint-driven, and that since no 
complaints had been received against Catholic hospitals or 
against secular refusals to dispense the drugs, there could be no 
claim of selective enforcement.111  The court proceeded to apply 
rational basis review, rather than strict scrutiny,112 and 
concluded that the plaintiff’s free exercise claim lacked merit.113
D. The Stormans Family Petitions the Supreme Court for 
Certiorari 
 
The Stormans family’s saga was not yet over, as they 
proceeded to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for 
a writ of certiorari.114
 
107 Id. 
  The eight-member court rejected the 
petition 5-3 in June 2016; Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice 
Roberts and Justice Thomas, strongly dissented from the decision 
108 Id. at 1081–82. 
109 Id. at 1082. Specifically, the Commission had issued official commentary 
stating that a pharmacy could not object to delivering drugs because they are too 
expensive. Id. 
110 Id. at 1083. 
111 Id. 
112 Under Smith, courts apply rational basis review if the law is neutral, 
generally applicable, and does not fall under one of the Smith exceptions. Heather 
M. Good, “The Forgotten Child of Our Constitution”: The Parental Free Exercise 
Right to Direct the Education and Religious Upbringing of Children, 54 EMORY L.J. 
641, 654 (2005). 
113 Stormans, 794 F.3d at 1085. 
114 Stormans v. Wiesman, BECKET, supra note 8. 
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to deny review: “There are strong reasons to doubt whether 
[Washington’s] regulations were adopted for—or that they 
actually serve—any legitimate purpose.”115  He continued, “there 
is much evidence that the impetus for the adoption of the 
regulations was hostility to pharmacists whose religious beliefs 
regarding abortion and contraception are out of step with 
prevailing opinion in the State.”116  Justice Alito went on to 
catalogue the findings of the trial court in regard to the 
discriminatory motivation of the regulation, noting in particular 
the emails of Mr. Saxe which referred explicitly to the Governor’s 
desire to penalize conscience-based objections.117  Justice Alito 
also pointed out that the trial court had concluded that the 
regulations as designed accomplished a “religious gerrymander,” 
which had been one of the reasons the Court struck down the 
regulations at issue in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye.118
Justice Alito also criticized the Ninth Circuit for ignoring 
evidence that the problem the State asserted it had an interest in 
fixing did not actually exist.
 
119  Specifically, Justice Alito pointed 
to the State’s own stipulation that “ ‘facilitated referrals do not 
pose a threat to timely access to lawfully prescribed medications,’ 
and indeed ‘help assure timely access to lawfully prescribed 
medications . . . includ[ing] Plan B.’ ”120  Finally, Justice Alito 
asserted that the numerous state pharmacy associations which 
had filed briefs encouraging the Court to review the decision 
showed the importance of providing Supreme Court review of the 
issue.121
 
115 Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman, 136 S. Ct. 2433, 2433 (2016) (Alito, J., 
dissenting). 
 
 
116 Id. 
117 Id. at 2434–35. 
118 Id. at 2435 (citations and internal quotations omitted). 
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. Specifically, Justice Alito cited the pharmacy associations’ contention that 
the Ninth Circuit’s decision had “ ‘upheld a radical departure from past regulation of 
the pharmacy industry’ that ‘threatens to reduce patient access to medication by 
forcing some pharmacies—particularly small, independent ones that often survive 
by providing specialty services not provided elsewhere—to close.’ ” Id. (quoting Brief 
for Nat’l and State Pharmacists’ Ass’ns. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 
4–5, Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman, 136 S. Ct. 2433 (2016) (No. 15-862)) (emphasis in 
original). 
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Justice Alito then gave a preliminary assessment of the 
regulations’ neutrality and general applicability under Smith.122  
Justice Alito gave great weight to the trial court’s determinations 
that the real operation of the rules almost exclusively burdened 
those with religious and not secular objections to providing 
emergency contraceptives.123  He pointed out that the secular 
exceptions have just as much potential to harm patient access as 
do the proposed religious exceptions, and yet the secular 
exceptions were allowed while the religious exceptions were 
not.124  Justice Alito went on to suggest that the Ninth Circuit’s 
determination that the Board itself did not actually permit the 
refusals for secular reasons was an improper usurpation of the 
trial court’s fact-finding function.125  Unlike the judges on the 
Ninth Circuit panel, Justice Alito did not find persuasive the fact 
that the Board’s enforcement mechanism was complaint-based.126
Justice Alito also wrote on the regulations’ underinclusivity.  
Disagreeing with the Ninth Circuit panel, Justice Alito would 
have found that the regulations as written were substantially 
underinclusive.
 
127  Specifically, he found that the exemption 
allowing pharmacies to refuse to dispense drugs to customers 
who could not pay explicitly allowed pharmacies to reject 
customers whose insurance the pharmacy did not accept.128  
Justice Alito pointed out that this included Medicare and 
Medicaid insurance and that therefore a pharmacy could deny 
access to all prescription drugs for certain customers.129
 
122 Stormans, 136 S. Ct. at 2436–40. 
  Since 
customers with Medicare or Medicaid are presumably the least 
able to travel to other pharmacies to fill their prescription drug 
123 Id. at 2437–38. 
124 Id. at 2438. 
125 “I think it likely that the Court of Appeals failed to accord the District 
Court’s findings appropriate deference. ‘If the district court’s account of the evidence 
is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety, the court of appeals may not 
reverse it even though convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would 
have weighed the evidence differently.’ ” Id. (quotng Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 
U.S. 564, 573–74 (1985)).  
126 “[T]he point remains that the Board tolerates widespread secular refusals 
while categorically declaring religious ones verboten. That supports the District 
Court’s finding that the real operation of the regulations is to uniquely burden 
religiously motivated conduct.” Id. at 2438–39 (internal quotations omitted). 
127 Id. at 2439. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
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needs, the regulation was substantially underinclusive.130
The bottom line is clear: Washington would rather have no 
pharmacy than one that doesn’t toe the line on abortifacient 
emergency contraceptives.  Particularly given the State’s 
stipulation that “facilitated referrals do not pose a threat to 
timely access” to such drugs . . . it is hard not to view its actions 
as exhibiting hostility toward religious objections.
  
Justice Alito also gave significant weight to the appellant’s 
contention that some pharmacy owners would rather close 
entirely than dispense medications that their beliefs forbid: 
131
In conclusion, the hotly-contested nature of the court 
proceedings at all three levels of the federal court system 
(including numerous amicus briefs on both sides at the Supreme 
Court level)
 
132
III. THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND’S APPROACH TO PHARMACISTS’ 
CONSCIENCE REGULATIONS 
 suggests that the Supreme Court should have 
granted the writ of certiorari in order to provide guidance to the 
rest of the states as to the constitutionality of Washington’s 
regulations. 
While the State of Washington provides one example of an 
approach to ensuring access to emergency contraceptives, this is 
not the only approach that a government has taken to solving the 
problem.  The ROI also confronted the problem of how to ensure 
access to emergency contraceptives while also respecting the 
conscience rights of pharmacists, and its approach appears to 
better balance the competing religious freedom and reproductive 
rights at issue. 
In 2007, ROI passed the Pharmacy Act of 2007.133  The 
Pharmacy Act of 2007 reconstituted the Pharmaceutical Society 
of Ireland (“PSI”) and vested it with the authority to create a 
comprehensive code of conduct for pharmacists operating in the 
country.134
 
130 Id. 
 
131 Id. at 2240. 
132 Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman, SCOTUSBLOG: SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
STATES BLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/stormans-inc-v-wiesman/ 
(last visited Feb. 28, 2018). 
133 Pharmacy Act 2007 (Act No. 20/2007) (Ir.), http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/ 
2007/act/20/enacted/en/pdf 
134 CODE OF CONDUCT FOR PHARMACISTS (PHARM. SOC’Y OF IR. 2009), 
http://www.thepsi.ie/Libraries/Publications/Code_of_Conduct_for_pharmacists.sflb.a
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In 2008, the PSI consulted extensively with several 
stakeholders as it worked to draft its regulations before 
submitting the completed Code of Conduct to the Irish 
parliament in 2009.135  The Code the PSI ultimately submitted, 
and which was ratified by the Irish parliament, is based on a six-
principle system defining pharmacists’ duties.136  Failure to 
discharge one’s duties is considered professional misconduct and 
subjects the pharmacist to discipline.137
The most important of the six principles for the subject at 
hand is Principle 1 and its accompanying commentary.  Principle 
1 acts as a foundational principle with reference to which all 
other enumerated principles must be interpreted.
 
138  It states: 
“The practice by a pharmacist of his/her profession must be 
directed to maintaining and improving the health, wellbeing, 
care and safety of the patient.  This is the primary principle and 
the following principles must be read in light of this principle.”139  
Thus, Principle 1 immediately establishes the importance of 
ensuring patient access to drugs legitimately sought; this is 
similar to Washington’s asserted interest in ensuring patient 
access to all lawful medications.140
The divergence between the Washington and ROI 
approaches becomes clear in the commentary to Principle 1.  The 
commentary provides pharmacists with information on how they 
can be sure they have discharged their obligations under the 
Principle; it states in part that in order to fulfill one’s obligations 
under the Principle, the pharmacist should “[e]nsure that in 
instances where they are unable to provide prescribed medicines 
or pharmacy services to a patient they must take reasonable 
action to ensure these medicines/services are provided and the 
 
 
shx (“The Pharmacy Act 2007 (‘the Act’) requires and enables pharmacists to 
practise in their profession in a regulated, controlled and safe environment in a 
manner that is focussed on the safety and interests of their patients.”). 
135 Id. Contrast this approach with that of the State of Washington, which only 
consulted with members of the pharmaceutical profession through the Governor’s 
task force, which included a roughly equal number of pro-choice advocates and 
pharmacists. Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 854 F. Supp. 2d 925, 940 (W.D. Wash. 2012), 
rev’d sub nom. Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman, 794 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 2015). 
136 CODE OF CONDUCT FOR PHARMACISTS, supra note 134. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. 
140 Stormans, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 972. 
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patient’s care is not jeopardised.”141  Thus, Principle 1, when read 
in conjunction with its commentary, establishes that in certain 
situations a pharmacist may be “unable” to provide prescribed 
medicines or pharmacy services.  A document providing specific 
guidance for supplying an emergency contraceptive drug 
establishes that a pharmacist may be “unable” to dispense the 
drug because the pharmacist harbors moral objections to doing 
so.142
But what about the pharmacist’s duty to take “reasonable 
action” to ensure that the patient can access the drug he or she 
needs?  The Irish courts have not spoken on what “reasonable 
action” entails.  The PSI’s own guidance on the subject is 
vague,
 
143 but it seems that course of practice has established that 
facilitated referrals satisfy the obligation.144
As a matter of policy, the ROI’s method strikes the proper 
balance between ensuring patient access to emergency 
contraceptives while also respecting the conscience rights of 
pharmacists.  The absence of lawsuits disputing the effectiveness 
of the system of facilitated referrals is telling.  The fact that the 
pharmaceutical profession itself created the rules
 
145 supports the 
arguments made by state pharmaceutical associations in the 
United States that the already-existing system of facilitated 
referrals is an adequate solution to the problem of ensuring 
access to contraceptives.146
 
141 CODE OF CONDUCT FOR PHARMACISTS, supra note 134 (emphasis added). 
 
142 See Guidance for Pharmacists on the Safe Supply of Non-Prescription 
Levonorgestrel 1500mcg for Emergency Hormonal Contraception, PHARMACY 
PRACTICE GUIDELINES: GUIDANCE ON THE SAFE SUPPLY OF MEDICINE (Pharm. Soc’y 
of Ir., Dublin, Ir.), Dec. 4, 2016, at 6. http://www.thepsi.ie/Libraries/Folder_ 
Pharmacy_Practice_Guidance/03_5_PSI_Guidance_for_Pharmacists_on_the_Safe_S
upply_of_Non-
Prescription_Levonorgestral_1500mcg_for_Emergency_Hormonal_Contraception.sfl
b.ashx  
143 Id. (“If supply to a patient is likely to be affected by the personal moral 
standards of a pharmacist, he or she must inform their superintendent and 
supervising pharmacist, who must ensure that suitable policies and procedures are 
in place to ensure patient care is not jeopardised and the patient is facilitated in 
accessing the information or service required to meet their needs.”). 
144 Our Campaign, RE(AL)-PRODUCTIVE HEALTH, https://realproductivehealth. 
com/our-campaign-2/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2018). 
145 CODE OF CONDUCT FOR PHARMACISTS, supra note 134. 
146 Brief of Nat’l and State Pharmacists’ Ass’ns as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners at 16, Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman, 136 S. Ct. 2433 (2016) (No. 15-862). 
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Additionally, the “reasonable action” standard is sufficiently 
flexible to cover situations in which a facilitated referral will not 
ensure patient access to the drug.  If the facilitated referral 
process will not work to ensure patient access to the drug, the 
pharmacist will be bound by the explicit words of Principle 1 that 
enshrine a patient-centered model of providing care.147  Thus, 
pharmacists who work at pharmacies that truly represent the 
only means of accessing drugs in their communities will not be 
able to shirk their obligations by referring patients to other 
pharmacies inaccessible to them.  The fact that a case alleging 
such a situation has not arisen in the Irish court system suggests 
that the current system is adequately meeting the needs of 
patients.   Calls to dispense with the facilitated referral system148
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION TO THE STORMANS V. WIESMAN 
PROBLEM 
 
are much like the State of Washington’s stocking and dispensing 
regulations: a solution without a problem. 
In the mid-2000s push to ensure access to emergency 
contraceptives, the State of Washington went too far.  While 
ensuring access to these drugs can be considered a compelling 
state interest,149 there were alternative methods the State could 
have used that would have better protected the conscience rights 
of pharmacists who believe in good faith that they cannot 
dispense these drugs without violating their religion.  By denying 
certiorari in Stormans v. Wiesman, the Supreme Court missed an 
important opportunity to clarify the meaning of the Free Exercise 
Clause by striking down Washington’s regulations, which are 
inferior as a matter of policy to the ROI’s “reasonable action” 
approach.150
 
147 CODE OF CONDUCT FOR PHARMACISTS, supra note 134. 
 
148 Our Campaign, supra note 144. 
149 Sch. of the Ozarks, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 86 F. Supp. 
3d 1066, 1074–76 (W.D. Mo. 2015). 
150 This Note does not argue that the ROI approach is the only constitutional 
approach to regulations on stocking and dispensing emergency contraceptives, but 
only that the regulations passed by Washington are unconstitutional and that the 
ROI approach would represent the best policy for the state to adopt as an 
alternative. In other words, the Supreme Court could have used the Stormans case 
to suggest the ROI approach in dicta, since the only justiciable question which the 
Stormans case would have presented to the Court is whether the specific regulations 
adopted by Washington are constitutional as applied to the Stormans family and 
other religious objectors. 
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A. Washington’s Regulations Are Unconstitutional under Smith 
and Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye 
Washington’s regulations violate the Free Exercise Clause 
because they are not neutral laws of general applicability.  As an 
initial matter, the Ninth Circuit was incorrect in finding that the 
regulations at issue were “neutral” for Smith purposes.151  As the 
Supreme Court explained in Church of Lukumi, a regulation is 
not neutral if it accomplishes a “religious gerrymander”; that is, 
if the regulations are neutral on their face but only touch 
religiously-based conduct.152  As Justice Alito noted in his dissent 
from the decision to deny certiorari, the trial court found 
plentiful evidence in the form of emails and other 
communications between those responsible for drafting 
Washington’s regulations to show that they intended them 
primarily to stamp out religious-based objections to the 
dispensing of emergency contraceptives while leaving objections 
for secular reasons untouched.153  This is just the kind of 
evidence that was present in Church of Lukumi and that Justice 
Kennedy found persuasive in his assessment of whether or not 
the regulation was neutral.154
Furthermore, the Washington regulations are not generally 
applicable.  The trial court correctly found that the Washington 
regulations fell under one of the exceptions to Smith: laws that 
give an administrator the discretion to make an individualized 
assessment are by definition not “generally applicable.”
 
155  While 
the Ninth Circuit concluded that the Board itself was not 
permitting exceptions other than those specifically 
enumerated,156 Justice Alito countered that the Ninth Circuit 
had not given appropriate deference to the trial court’s conclusion 
of fact on the subject.157
 
151 Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman, 794 F.3d 1064, 1079 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 
152 Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 535–36 
(1993) (citations and internal quotations omitted). 
153 Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman, 136 S. Ct. 2433, 2434–35 (2016). 
154 Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 526–27. 
155 Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990). 
156 Stormans, 794 F.3d at 1080–81. 
157  Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman, 136 S. Ct. at 2438. Specifically, the trial court 
had found persuasive the testimony of individual board members that the Board as 
a unit was allowing these exemptions to occur; the Ninth Circuit independently 
concluded that the testimony of individual board members could not substitute for 
the entire Board’s official commentary. Id.(citations omitted). 
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Since the regulations are neither neutral nor generally 
applicable, they must be subjected to Sherbert-style strict 
scrutiny.158  The Court has previously assumed, without deciding, 
a compelling government interest in ensuring that citizens have 
access to contraception.159  Because the State of Washington 
asserted a related interest in passing the regulations,160
After the government has proved a compelling interest, it 
must show both that the action being challenged actually 
advances the interest, and that it is the least restrictive means of 
advancing that interest.
 the first 
element of strict scrutiny may be satisfied.  The problems arise in 
the application of the second part of the test. 
161  The Washington regulations satisfy 
neither requirement.  First, the trial court, reinforced by Justice 
Alito, had already made a compelling argument that the 
regulations are underinclusive with respect to the advancement 
of its interest in providing access to contraceptives.162  
Specifically, the regulations are underinclusive in the sense that 
they allow exemptions for a wide variety of secular reasons, both 
explicitly in the regulations and as established in practice.163  
This causes the regulations not to advance the State’s interest in 
that citizens still will not be able to access contraceptives as long 
as the pharmacy can provide a valid secular reason for not 
stocking or dispensing them.164
Second, the regulations also do not advance the state 
interest in the sense that they leave religious objectors with only 
one option: getting out of the pharmacy business.
   
165  As Justice 
Alito explained, this would leave the entire community served by 
that pharmacy without a way of accessing any medications at 
all;166 this directly contradicts Washington’s asserted interest in 
ensuring access to all medications, including contraceptives.167
 
158 Marin, supra note 25, at 1438. 
 
159 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2780 (2014). 
160 Stormans, 794 F.3d at 1071. 
161 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406–09 (1963). 
162 Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 854 F. Supp. 2d 925, 955–56 (W.D. Wash. 2012), 
rev’d sub nom. Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman, 794 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 2015). 
163 Id. 
164 Id. at 969–70. 
165 Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman, 136 S. Ct. 2433, 2435 (2016) (citations omitted). 
166 Id. at 2440. 
167 Stormans, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 942. 
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Finally, the Washington regulations are not the least 
restrictive means of advancing the state’s asserted interest.  At 
trial, the witnesses from the Board of Pharmacy were unable to 
identify a single instance of a person being denied access to a 
drug because of the system of facilitated referral,168 and the State 
itself even admitted that such referrals are “often the most 
effective means to meet the patient’s request when a pharmacy 
or pharmacist is unable or unwilling to provide the requested 
medication.”169  The Stormans family’s pharmacy itself is located 
within a five-mile radius of thirty other pharmacies which stock 
and dispense the emergency contraceptives that the Stormans 
family were unwilling to dispense.170
B. The ROI Approach is the Best Alternative from a Policy 
Perspective 
  In sum, because the 
Washington regulations are neither neutral nor generally 
applicable, and since they cannot pass the Sherbert test, 
Washington should adopt an alternative method for ensuring 
access to emergency contraceptives that does not violate the Free 
Exercise Clause.  The ROI approach provides the best alternative 
from a policy perspective. 
Had the Court exercised its opportunity to clarify the 
meaning of the Free Exercise Clause by striking down 
Washington’s regulations, the state would have been forced to 
craft new ones.  The ROI’s “reasonable action” standard, with its 
focus on facilitated referrals, represents the best option from a 
policy perspective for a multitude of reasons. 
First, the ROI approach was created by the pharmacy 
industry’s own self-regulatory body in Ireland,171
 
168 Id. at 947–48. 
 meaning that it 
best reflects the opinions of those in the industry on how the 
problem should be addressed.  Because pharmacists themselves 
are in the best position to determine both what steps are 
necessary to ensure access—since they actually perform the 
services that are being accessed—and whether and how to draw 
the line between encouraging and compelling pharmacists to 
perform their function in the community—since they themselves 
must abide by the regulations they choose—their opinions on the 
169 Id. at 934. 
170 Stormans v. Wiesman, BECKET, supra note 8. 
171 CODE OF CONDUCT FOR PHARMACISTS, supra note 134. 
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subject should be given special weight.  Notably, the ROI 
approach comports with the position taken by the over thirty 
U.S. state pharmacist associations which together filed an 
amicus brief to the Stormans family’s petition for certiorari.172
The second reason that the ROI approach represents the best 
policy approach to this problem is that it has engendered little to 
no judicial controversy in Ireland.  As an initial matter, although 
the ROI and the United States may not be similar from a 
demographic perspective,
  In 
sum, the pharmacists themselves have decided that the 
facilitated referral approach is the best way to deal with the 
access problem. 
173 both countries have long grappled 
with similar problems of balancing religious rights with rapidly 
changing societal attitudes toward reproductive rights.174
There has not been a single judicial challenge to the 
“reasonable action” standard of facilitated referrals, and this 
alone should carry great weight in evaluating its effectiveness.  
While critics have asserted that problems do exist,
   
175 these 
alleged problems have not manifested themselves as tangible 
challenges to the effectiveness of facilitated referrals.  This 
comports with Washington’s own experience and that of the 
many other states which provide conscience exemptions; an 
access problem with facilitated referrals has simply not been 
shown to exist.176
 
172 Brief of Nat’l and State Pharmacists’ Ass’ns as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners at 1, Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman, 136 S. Ct. 2433 (2016) (No. 15-862). 
  In the absence of such a problem, it defies 
reason to craft a solution which compels pharmacists to violate 
their most basic beliefs. 
173 For example, about 84% of Ireland’s population identifies as Catholic, Paul 
Hyland, Number of Catholics at Record High, Despite Lowest Percentage Ever, THE 
JOURNAL IE, Oct. 18, 2012, http://www.thejournal.ie/regious-statistics-census-2011-
640180-Oct2012/, while only 20% of Americans do, Religious Landscape Study, PEW 
RESEARCH CENTER, http://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscape-study/ (last 
visited Feb. 28, 2018). 
174 See generally Dean van Nguyen, Why Ireland Has Lagged Behind the Rest of 
Europe on Reproductive Rights, THE ATLANTIC (May 3, 2013), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/05/why-ireland-has-lagged-
behind-the-rest-of-europe-on-reproductive-rights/275542/; and Stephanie Russell-
Kraft, The Right to Abortion—and Religious Freedom, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 3, 2016), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/03/abortion-rights-a-matter-of-
religious-freedom/471891/. 
175 Our Campaign, supra note 144. 
176 Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman, 136 S. Ct. 2433, 2435 (2016). 
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The third and final reason that the ROI approach represents 
the best policy choice is that its “reasonable action” standard is 
flexible enough to advance the state’s interest in solving access 
problems once they do arise.  Washington could adopt the 
standard while including, in a commentary to the rule, a 
stipulation that reasonable action might require an individual 
pharmacy to stock and dispense emergency contraceptives if that 
pharmacy is actually the only option reasonably available to 
members of the community in which it exists.   
Notably, this option would satisfy the “least restrictive 
means” element of the Sherbert test—it would only require that 
objectors stock and dispense emergency contraceptives when 
there is no other option available to the people of the community.  
While this might cause some smaller rural pharmacies to close 
their doors rather than sell the drugs, Justice Alito acknowledged 
that the marketplace would likely act to fill these gaps.177
CONCLUSION 
 
Despite the decline of adherence to organized religion in 
America generally,178
At the same time, there is no doubt that attitudes in the 
United States toward the use of contraceptives will continue to 
evolve.  As long as these competing aspirations—to safeguard 
religious liberty and to protect the right of citizens’ access to the 
medications they need—continue to conflict with one another, the 
Court must exercise its power to protect important constitutional 
rights.  By choosing not to grant certiorari in the Stormans case, 
the country’s highest court has thrown the viability of future 
Free Exercise claims into doubt.  Given the availability of a 
workable alternative to Washington’s regulations in the form of 
 there is no doubt that the Free Exercise 
Clause still has an important role to play in protecting the rights 
of religious individuals not to be compelled to act against their 
fundamental beliefs.  When the Supreme Court does not provide 
review of state court decisions that likely violate its substance, it 
leaves the states without the guidance necessary to fashion their 
laws in compliance with it. 
 
177 Id. at 2440. 
178 See generally Mark L. Movsesian, Defining Religion in American Law: 
Psychic Sophie and the Rise of the Nones, ROBERT SCHUMAN CENTRE FOR ADVANCED 
STUDIES (Feb. 1, 2014), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2399 
470. 
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the  “reasonable action” approach, the Court’s decision not to 
strike down Washington’s regulations is particularly troubling.  
The current state of affairs is unacceptable to people like the 
Stormans, and there is a compelling argument to be made that it 
should not be acceptable to those who value the protections of the 
rights of the minority which have characterized this country 
throughout its existence. 
 
